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Abstract
Firms selling goods whose quality level deteriorates over time often face difficult
decisions when unsold inventory remains. Since the leftover product is often perceived
to be of lower quality than the new product, carrying it over to the next period offers
the firm a second selling opportunity, but at a reduced price. By doing so, however,
the firm subjects sales of its new product to competition from the leftover product.
We present a dynamic model that captures the effect of this competition on the firm’s
production and pricing decisions. We characterize the firm’s optimal strategy and
find conditions under which the firm is better off carrying all, some, or none of its
leftover inventory to the next period. We also show that the price of the new product
is independent of the quality level of the leftover product. Finally, we relax the model
assumption and assume that there is demand uncertainty in both periods. We run a
simulation and find that the firm finds it optimal to introduce the old units only if the
level of uncertainty is low and does not exceed a certain threshold.
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1 Introduction
When firms complain of competitive pressure on one of their product lines, they are typically
referring to the actions of other firms seeking to steal away their customers. For companies
selling perishable goods however, competition may also arise internally when the firm sells
inventory of its perishable goods that were leftover from previous periods. If their customers’
perception of the quality of these leftovers is lower than that of their new product, the leftover
products are often marked down in price. By doing so, however, the firm subjects sales of
its new product to competition from its leftover product.
Not all perishable products face this “internal” competition described above. Perishable
goods often carry expiration dates, after which they can no longer be sold. A firm providing
such a good often replenishes its stock with new product before all of its old product (of the
same type) has been sold. The pricing and stocking decisions of the firm in this situation
depend upon the characteristics of the perishable product being offered. We characterize
perishable products into three types based on the perceived quality level of the aged product
by the consumer.
Type 1 items’ perceived quality does not degrade continuously over time but, instead,
becomes unusable after a given date. Airline seats and hotel rooms are an example of this
type of product. Firms selling type 1 product often set multiple prices (and corresponding
quantities) depending on the time remaining before expiration and salvages all expired prod-
uct for zero revenue. The practice of revenue management was developed specifically for
these type products, a review of which is provided by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). Type 2
items’ value deteriorates continuously over time reaching a value of zero when a new version
of the item becomes available. Examples include newspapers and weather forecast. Firms
offering type 2 products usually remove all of the old product and replace it with the new
ones once they become available. The discounting of Type 2 items often fall under the
realm of dynamic pricing. Bitran and Caldentey (2002) provide a review of dynamic pricing
models along with many applications.
In this work we focus however on perishable products from a third type, where type 3
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items’ perceived quality deteriorates over time but may not reach a value of zero by the time
a new version of the item becomes available. The deterioration does ensure however, that the
customer values an older product lower than a newer one. Firms selling type 3 product often
price differentiate the old and new product. Examples of type 3 product are abundant and
can be divided into two main categories. The first category includes products whose actual
functionality deteriorates over time such as fruits, vegetables and milk. Supermarkets often
mark down their older produce after restocking with fresher product. The second category
includes products whose functionality does not degrade but the customers’ perceived utility
of these products deteriorates over time. Examples include fashionable clothing and high
technology products with short life cycles. Almost every fashion goods retailer provides a
discount section on their shop floor or website where they offer last season’s unsold designs
at discounted prices.
In this paper, we focus on the management of type 3 items where a firm faces quantity
and pricing decisions for product with different quality levels. Since price, availability, and
quality are key dimensions that define a consumer’s decision to purchase a product, it is
critical to understand how the quality of a product affects the firm’s operating decisions.
The magnitude of these decisions can be quite substantial. For example, Bloomingdale’s
Department Store estimates that 50% (around $400M) of their total sales for women’s apparel
is sold through the use of mark-down prices. An additional 9% ($72M) is sold to salvage
retailers for pennies on the dollars to avoid excessive cannibalization of their new designs
(Berman, 2003).
Observing the pricing and stocking policies of firms selling type 3 products shows a wide
range of practices employed. For example, consider the opposing policies of two national
bagel chains (Bruegger’s and Chesapeake) who compete in the same markets and have similar
operating procedures. Stores of each chain begin each day facing a decision on how many
bagels to bake before opening their shops and observing demand. Despite the similarities
in their operating and market conditions, the two chains use different policies for how to
handle bagels that are leftover at the end of the day. Chesapeake Bagels disposes of all
leftover bagels while Bruegger’s Bagels carries the leftover bagels over to be sold in the next
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day. Since the quality of a bagel depreciates quickly over time, Bruegger’s Bagels sells the
leftover bagels at a discounted price compared to the price of its fresh bagels, then disposes
of any bagels that are older than two days since they consider them too low of a quality to
sell at any price.
Why do two firms facing similar production and market conditions handle their perishable
inventory so differently? Does the “No Carry” policy dominate the “Carry Everything”
policy or vice versa? Should a firm follow a combination of these policies and only carry
a portion of its unsold inventory into the next period? If a firm pursues this combination
“Carry Some” policy, how should it price its leftover product in relation to its new product?
What is clear from the bagel chains and many other industry examples is that there exists a
difference of opinion among managers on how to manage the pricing and quantity decisions
of perishable product. Other examples of markets that face this problem include: a grocery
store that periodically receives shipments of fresh produce and sells it with any unsold
inventory from previous periods; a high technology company that has not sold all of its
previous model’s stock before the new model design is ready for the market; and a textbook
or software company that still holds inventory of the current version of its product when the
new version becomes available.
To gain intuition into the broader mix of problems, we study a firm selling a perishable
good that lasts for two periods and has two states. The product is considered “new” if
it is sold in the same period it was produced, or “old” if it is sold the period after it was
produced. The old units suffer a quality reduction and, therefore, provide lower valuations
for the customers. Thus, the firm charges lower prices for the old units in comparison to the
new units. Referring back to our bagel store example, the chain that carries over its unsold
bagels prices them at one third the price of its fresh bagels. We model a two period problem
to study the competition effect between the two levels of product in the second period on
the firm’s stocking and pricing decisions in the first period. In the second period, we model
the competition on the new product from product that did not sell in the first period and is
carried over to the second.
The key decisions that the firm must make include: the price and purchase quantity of
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new product in both the first and second period, the quantity of unsold product from the first
period to make available to the customer in the second period, and the price to charge for
the old product in the second period. We solve the firm’s problem and find that the optimal
price of the new product remains the same, regardless of the firm’s decision to sell the old
product and is independent of the quality level of the old product. Thus, competition from
the old product only affects the firm’s second period new product quantity decision, not its
new product pricing decision. Further, we find thresholds for the quality level of the old
product where the firm should choose to carry all, some, or none of its unsold product over
to the next period. These results stem from the fact that demand for the new product is
dependent upon the quantity, price, and quality level of the old product competing against
it. Through a numerical study, we determine that a firm gains the most benefit from a
“Carry” policy when: 1) Uncertainty over the market potential1 in the first period is high,
2) The quality degradation of the unsold product is low, and 3) The cost to prepare the
carried over unit for the market is low compared to the cost to purchase new units. In
two extensions to our base model, we find that the firm achieves near optimal profits if it
maintains a constant price for both periods and that the inclusion of even small amounts of
uncertainty in the second period quickly diminishes the benefits of the “Carry” policy.
1.1 Literature Review
Our research draws upon work in both the operations and marketing areas. We use a similar
notion of quality as the marketing literature, where consumers are vertically differentiated
over quality but always prefer a higher quality product over a lower one for any given
price. Moorthy (1984) solves the monopoly product line problem where a firm has to
make product line decisions regarding the number of categories it produces and the level of
quality built into each category. He shows that higher-end consumers prefer lower-quality
products if they are sufficiently attractive. Thus, the cannibalization effect is the main
1We capture uncertainty in the model through the market potential, defined as the upper bound of
consumers’ valuation for the product’s services. Based on these consumers’ valuations, we derive the
demand functions and the market potential’s interpretation in the demand system is the size of the market.
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determinant of the optimal price-quality decisions. To solve the cannibalization problem,
the firm must offer a price-quality bundle such that the highest valuation consumers buy
their preferred quality but the lower valuation consumers get a quality level that is lower
than what they desire. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) investigate the competition between
the product lines of two manufacturers and find that if the difference between the levels of
quality is sufficient, both firms produce. Desai (1999) extends Moorthy’s model and solves
the doupoly problem, where consumers are differentiated by both their quality preferences
and their tastes. Ahmadi and Yang (2000) explore the effects of external competition from
third-party firms taking advantage of an arbitrage situation when the producing firm sells a
product for different prices in different markets. All of these models are for a single period
and the market potential is assumed to be deterministic (the firm sells every unit produced).
In contrast, we consider a two period model where the market potential is stochastic in the
first period and the purchase of product involves a positive lead-time so that the quantity
and pricing decisions must be made before the market potential is realized.
The use of a two period model with a quality parameter differentiating the old and new
inventory of a firm has some similarities to the durable goods literature. Desai, Koenigsberg,
Purohit (2002) use a durability parameter to represent the competition between new units
and previously sold units that reenter the market during the second period. Their durability
parameter represents the level of competition between new and used product while we con-
centrate on nondurable goods, where the only competition occurs between the unsold “lower
quality” old units leftover from the previous period and the new “just ordered” units. An-
other difference occurs in the timing of the firm’s decisions. In Desai, Koenigsberg, Purohit
(2002), the selling quantity in the first period is chosen after the uncertainty in the market
potential is resolved. In our model, both quantity and price decisions must be made before
uncertainty is resolved. The objective of our paper is to examine how the quality reduction
of unsold units, and the subsequent cannibalization problem created by carrying the unsold
units into the next period affects the firms’ pricing and production decisions in a newsvendor
model.
On the operations side, Petruzzi and Dada (1999) review extensions to the newsvendor
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model in which the stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously, before the
uncertainty in the market potential is resolved. Despite the myopic nature of the newsvendor
model, they give conditions where their model can be used in a multi-period setting under
the assumption that the quality level of the unsold product never deteriorates. Cachon and
Kok (2002) offer a simple adjustment to the newsvendor model that accounts for the fact
that the salvage value of the unsold product depends upon the quantity (but not the quality
level) available. They find that newsvendor quantities not accounting for this relationship
always exceed the optimal quantity, leading to excessive markdown costs. Gallego and
van Ryzin (1994) explore dynamic pricing of a perishable product but do not consider the
competition effect of selling leftover product from previous periods.
Several papers study a two period version of the newsvendor model where a second
order opportunity exists in the second period: Donohue(2000), Fisher and Raman (1996),
Fisher, Rajaram and Raman (2001), Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997), and Petruzzi and Dada
(2001) provide a representative sample of this area. Of these, only Petruzzi and Dada
(2001) model price as a function of the quantity procured. In their model, demand is a
deterministic function but contains an unknown parameter characterized by a subjective
distribution that is updated over time. Thus, by selecting a price-quantity pair each period,
the firm eventually learns the true demand function. The product life cycle in their model
last only for a single period, so no inventory is carried over from one period to the next. In
contrast, the firm in our model learns the true demand function immediately after the first
period and has the option of carrying over unsold inventory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
In section 3 we compare a No Carry (NC) policy with a Carry (C) policy in a two-period
problem where the firm faces uncertainty in the market potential only in the first period. In
section 4 we provide extensions to our model to include the cases of a constant new product




This section describes the model and lays out the assumptions about the firm, the product,
and the market. We begin by stating the key assumptions of our model and defining a quality
parameter that represents the customer’s perceived differentiation between the new product
and the old product in the second period. We then derive inverse demand functions for
each product type based on the consumers’ utility functions. Since the problem we describe
pertains to both manufacturing firms that produce and sell their own product and retailers
who only purchase product from other firms, we use the generic term “purchase” through
the rest of this paper to represent either production or purchasing decisions.
Assumption 1. Key problem dynamics are captured in a two period model
We consider a two-period game with uncertainty in the market potential during the first
period and potential competition in the second period from product that did not sell in
the first period and is carried over to the second. Our objective is two fold. First, we
study how the presence of competition from lower quality units affects the firm’s pricing and
stocking decisions for its new product after the old units have been carried over. This is
captured through our second period analysis. Second, the first period allows us to study
how the possibility of carrying unsold inventory to the next period affects the firm’s pricing
and stocking decisions when it only purchases new product. Thus, a two-period model is
sufficient and allows us to maintain tractability.
In the first period, the firm chooses the price, P1, and quantity, x1, of its product before
knowing the complete characterization of the market potential (the maximum price the firm
can charge for the product and still sell one unit). Demand for the firm’s product is a
function of the unknown market potential and is decreasing with the firm’s price. After
demand realization, the firm may be left with unsold units and faces a
choice on how many of these units to carry over to the second period. Without loss
of generality, the salvage value of any unsold units not carried over to the second period is
normalized to zero.
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Assumption 2. In the second period, the market potential is deterministic2.
This assumption is reasonable for many products where the demand in latter periods is
highly correlated to demand in the current period. For example, the introduction of many
new products can be divided into two distinct periods. An initial period (learning period)
where the firm faces large uncertainty in the market potential of the new product and a
second period where most of the uncertainty is resolved but some of the features of the model
may change. Ehrenberg (2001) shows that for the majority of new products, most market
uncertainty is resolved after 6 weeks. Our main goal is to show the effect of competition
between the firm’s new product with its carried over product. This assumption allows us
to isolate this effect and gain analytical tractability to the firm’s first period decisions. We
latter investigate the sensitivity of our results when this assumption is violated through a
simulation experiment.
At the beginning of the second period, the firm has Y units leftover from the previous
period, where Y can be zero if demand exceeded supply in the first period or if the firm
chooses not to carry over its unsold product. The firm can purchase new units at a price
of c each and prepares old units at a per unit cost of h. The cost of preparing the old units
includes the holding/storage cost plus any special packaging and preparation required for
making the old units available to the market. The firm’s quantity decisions in the second
period include the number of new units, x2, and the number of old units, y, made available to
the market. The quantity of new product the firm can purchase is not capacity constrained,
but the firm cannot prepare more than Y of the old units, i.e., y ≤ Y. Demand in the second
period is deterministic, but inversely proportional to the price and quality deterioration of
the product made available. We assume that the firm acts rationally and knows at the end
of the first period exactly how many of the old units it will sell in the second period (since
the market potential in the second period is deterministic) so it only incurs a preparation
cost, h, for the y units it sells.
Assumption 3. Consumers are heterogenous in their valuations of the product and are
2In section 4.2 we relax this assumption and explore the firm’s decisions when there is uncertainty in the
firm’s second period market potential.
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distributed uniformly in the interval [0,α].
To capture the effect of the prices of old and new units on the consumers’ demand,
we develop linear inverse demand functions. We derive the demand functions from the
consumers’ utility functions and assume that consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations
of the product. In this vertical differentiation model,3 we use the random variable φ ∈ (0,α)
to represent a consumer’s valuation of the service provided by the product, where α represents
the valuation of the consumer that values the product the most. Note that a consumer with
a higher φ values the product more than a consumer with a lower φ. Finally, we assume
that the consumers’ valuations are distributed uniformly in the interval [0,α] and, in any
period, each consumer uses at most one unit.
While this representation is common in the literature and has many empirical validations,
the incorporation of market potential uncertainty into a linear inverse demand function
carries the restriction that the variance of the market potential is not affected by the product’s
price. Thus, a multiplicative model of the inverse demand function may be interesting for
future research.
Assumption 4. The quality of the old product is exogenous.
To model the leftover product’s quality level, we use the parameter q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, to
represent how much a unit unsold in the previous period deteriorates before the current
period. All unsold units from the first period deteriorate by (1−q) before the second period
and provide the customer with a utility that is less than that provided by a new unit (We
latter investigate the case where the consumers’ valuation for the old model remains the
same but they perceive the new model as providing higher quality). In our utility model,
this implies that a consumer’s valuation of the services from a unsold unit is qφ. Note
that if q = 0, consumers get no utility out of the unit (it has deteriorated fully) and the
manufacturer does not sell it. If q = 1, consumers view the new and old units as being
identical and derive equal utility from either type. The quality level is considered exogenous,
3A vertical differentiation model refers to markets where consumers’ valuation for a product characteristic
(product quality in our model) has an agreed order, i.e. all consumers prefer a higher quality product to a
lower quality product (Tirole 1988).
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thus the firm has no control over the deterioration of its product. Although there are many
practical examples where this is true, there may be cases where the firm can influence the
quality level of the carried over units through its spending on storage and preparation cost.
We leave this extension for future research.
We consider the following inverse demand system4:
P o2 = q(α− x2 − y) ,
P n2 = α− x2 − qy ,
P1 = α− x1,
where P n2 represents the price of the new product in the second period, P
o
2 represents the
price of the old product in the second period, and P1 represents the price of the new product
in the first period. Note that the quality level of the old products has different effect on the
price of the new and the old units. As the old product quality increases, the price of the old
product increases as the old product provides better services to consumers. However, as old
product quality increases, the price of the new product decreases as the old a new products
become closer substitute and there is more (internal) competition.
To account for uncertainty in the market potential, let the upper bound of the consumer’s
valuation α be made up of two parts, A+u, where A represents the deterministic piece and u
represents the unknown piece. We assume that u is a random variable independently drawn
from F (·), that F is twice differentiable over [0, B], has a finite mean µ, a nondecreasing
hazard rate, and its inverse function exists. This representation of demand is common in
the economics and marketing literature and can be interpreted as a case where the shape
of the demand curve is deterministic while the scaling parameter representing the market
potential has a random component.
The inverse demand functions can now be represented as
P1 = A− x1 + u (1)
4Full derivation of the demand system is in the appendix.
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for the first period (since there are no old units available to sell in the first period then we
only need one inverse demand function) and
P n2 = A− x2 − qy + u (2)
and P o2 = q(A− x2 − y + u) (3)
for the second period. The latter functions capture the competition between the firm’s
old product with its just produced products. We preview the model’s parameters, random
variables, and decision variables in the table below.
First Period Second Period
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition
Parameters A Deterministic market potential R Realization of A+ u
q Quality level Y Unsold units of x1
c Cost to purchase new product
h Cost to carry old product
B Upper limit for rand var u
RandomVars u Stochastic market potential None
DecisionVars P1 Price of new products P n2 Price of new products
x1 New products purchased x2 New products purchased
xd1 Deterministic component of x1 P
o
2 Price of old products
z Safety stock component of x1 y Old products made available
Table 1: Parameters and Variables
3 Analysis
We consider two policies; No Carry (NC), and Carry (C) . Under the NC policy, the firm
never carries leftover units over to sell in the second period while under the C policy, it does.
We compare the two policies in a two-period model where the firm faces uncertainty in the
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market potential only in the first period. To differentiate the results of the two policies, we
place a tilde (˜) above the decision variables for the NC policy.
3.1 Policy NC: No Carry
Under policy NC, the firm never carries leftover inventory over from one period to the next.
Thus, the firm’s two decisions each period are how many new units to purchase and how
much to charge for each unit. To find the sub game perfect equilibrium we solve the game
backwards starting with the firm’s second period decisions.
3.1.1 Second Period: No Uncertainty
In the second period the firm knows the realization of the market potential before making
its quantity, x̃2, and pricing, P̃ n2 , decisions. Let R represent the realization of (A+ u) .
The firm’s inverse demand function is given by
P̃ n2 = R− x̃2 .
The second period price is a direct outcome of the quantity decisions so the firm’s only
decision is how many new units to purchase. Let Π̃2 represent the firm’s profit in the second
period when using the NC policy. The firm’s second period objective is
Max P̃n2 Π̃2 = ( P̃
n
2 − c)x̃2 ,
which is concave in x̃2. Checking first order conditions yields the familiar monopoly results














3.1.2 First Period: With Uncertainty
In the first period, both the quantity, x̃1, and price, P̃1, must be set before observing the
size of the market. The firm’s objective in the first period is to maximize its expected profit
over the first and second periods. Let Π̃12 represent the firm’s expected profit over the
first and second period when using the NC policy. The firm’s expected profit includes its
revenue (the firm’s chosen price times the minimum of the amount of product purchased in
the first period and the firm’s monopoly quantity chosen after observing the realized market
potential) minus the purchase cost plus a discount factor, ρ, times the second period profit
given in (4).
Since the market potential is made up of a deterministic and a stochastic component, we
divide the firm’s quantity decision x̃1 into two components. Let x̃d1 = A− P̃1 represent the
part of the quantity decision corresponding to the knownmarket potential and z̃ represent the
part corresponding to the stochastic market potential. The stochastic component represents
the safety stock that the firm holds to account for the market uncertainty. The profit for
the first period after the total market potential is realized (u = U) is the difference between
the firm’s sales revenue and cost plus its discounted second period profit:
Π̃12
³
















+ ρΠ̃∗2, if z̃ ≤ U
.
The firm’s first period objective isMaxP̃1,z̃ Π̃12. Following our assumption that the uncertain
component of the market potential is continuously distributed, the firm’s expected profit over



















f (u) du− c(x̃d1 + z̃) + ρΠ̃∗2. (5)
The firm’s first period decisions do not affect its second period’s profit so the firm’s objective
reduces to a single period problem. Whitin (1955) was the first to introduce a single period
problem with quantity and pricing decisions. Zabel (1970) introduced the solution method
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of first optimizing P̃1 for a given z̃ and then searching over the optimal trajectory to maximize
(5). Petruzzi and Dada (1999) provide an excellent review of the literature in this area and
show that (5) is concave and unimodal in z̃ and P̃ ∗1 (z̃) as long as the distribution for u has a
















where Θ (z̃∗) =
RB
z̃∗(u − z̃∗)f(u)du. The total purchase quantity is the combination of the




3.2 Policy C: Carry Leftover Product
Under policy C, the firm may carry leftover inventory over into the second period. The firm
faces the same quantity and pricing decisions in the first period as in the NC policy case. In
the second period however, the firm faces additional decisions on how many of the carried
over units to prepare for the market and what to price them at. To find the subgame perfect
equilibrium, we solve the problem using backward induction.
3.2.1 Second Period: No Uncertainty
At the start of the second period, the firm holds Y units of leftover inventory from the first
period and may have to purchase additional new units. Let Π2(Y ) represent the firm’s profit
in the second period when carrying Y units of unsold inventory over from the first period,
Y ≥ 0. The inverse demand functions are given by (2) and (3). The pricing decisions
are direct outcomes of the quantity decisions. Since the firm’s second period decisions
are dependent upon the amount of leftover product carried over from the first period, we
characterize these conditions below.
14
Firm Has No Leftover Inventory With no leftover inventory from the pervious period,
the firm’s only decision is how many new units to purchase. The firm’s objective is
MaxPn2 Π2(0) = (P
n
2 − c)x2 . (8)
The firm’s objective is identical to the firm’s objective for policy NC. Thus, the optimal
new product production quantity, price, and profit are the same as (4).
Next, we analyze the case where the firm begins the second period with leftover inventory
from the first period.
Firm Has Leftover Inventory In this case, the firm starts the second period with Y
units of leftover inventory that was not sold the first period. In addition to the decisions on
the new-product, the firm has to make decisions regarding how many old units to prepare,
y, and what to price them, P o2 . The firm’s objective is
MaxPn2 ,P o2 Π2(Y ) = (P
n
2 − c)x2 + (P o2 − h)y (9)
s.t. y ≤ Y.
The firm’s objective is concave in P n2 and P
o
2 . Checking the first order conditions of (9)
yields several interesting results. Proposition 1 looks at the effect on the firm’s new product
pricing and quantity decisions when faced with competition from its old product.
Proposition 1 The optimal price for the new product, P n∗2 =
R+c
2
, is independent of
the quality level of the old product5.
Proposition 1 states that the optimal price of the new product is the same as in the
NC policy and is independent of the quality level of the old product. Thus, competition
from the old product only affects the firm’s second period new quantity decision, not its new
product pricing decision. The intuition behind this result is that the valuation of consumers
who purchase new units does not depend on the quality level of the old units; thus the price
5All proofs are provided in the appendix.
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of the new units is independent of the quality reduction and the firm extracts the monopoly
surplus from each buyer (of new units). Though the price of the new product is not affected
by the quality level, the firm does take the quality deterioration into account to moderate the
cannibalization effect. The firm does so through its quantity decisions. As the quality level
of the old product decreases, the firm increases the number of new units it makes (orders)
and places an upper bound on the number of old units that are carried over from the previous
period. The next two propositions give the quality threshold levels that determine whether
to sell all, some, or none of the old product.
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold level for the quality of the old product, h
c
, below
which the firm only sells the new product.
Proposition 2 states that a lower quality threshold exists such that the firms’ ratio of old
unit carrying cost to its new unit purchasing cost must fall above it before carrying over any
unsold product becomes attractive. If the customer’s perception of the quality level of the
old product is so low that they are unwilling to cover the marginal carrying cost, then it is
optimal for the firm not to carry. We define h as the total cost to carry and prepare the old
units for the second period. It includes not only the normal inventory holding cost but also
any additional packaging, special storage conditions, labor, etc. For example, the selling of
older produce and day-old bagels often involve repackaging which includes expenses other
than just the holding cost. For example, some types of electronic circuit boards oxidize over
time and must be kept in expensive low-oxygen storage facilities. With the lower quality
threshold, firms can make informed decisions on whether or not the benefit of carrying their
unsold inventory into future periods exceeds these cost. The criteria for whether to carry
all of the unsold product or only a portion of it is given in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold level for the quality of the old product, R−c+h
R
,







Proposition 3 states that an upper quality threshold exists, above which the firm sells
all of its leftover product up to the minimum of the number of old units available, Y, or a
monopoly quantity modified by the quality level and based on the cost structure of the old
units, qR−h
2q




larger benefit to the firm than do the sale of new product. Therefore, the firm has higher
incentives to carry and prepare the old product than to produce a new product. Only under
very rare circumstances will the firm have so much unsold inventory from the first period
that it chooses to not sell any new product and limits its quantity of old product to its
monopoly quantity.
The upper threshold level (1 − c−h
R
) is more robust for changes in h than the lower
threshold level (h
c





) decreases; the range of the quality levels where the firm carries only some of the unsold
inventories shrinks, and the ranges where the firm carries none or all of its unsold inventory
expands. In practice, this means that firms facing either low or high h may not be too
far from optimal if they restrict themselves to carrying either all or nothing of their unsold
product.
Propositions 1 through 3 define the conditions necessary to state the firm’s optimal prices
and quantities. The three propositions characterize the following five conditions needed for
the problem’s solution. The five conditions are summarized below.
Condition 1) q ≤ h
c
or Y = 0
Condition 2) h
c

















≤ q & qR−h
2q
≤ Y
Under the first condition, either the firm ends the first period with no leftover units or
it knows the quality of the leftover units will fall below the threshold given in Proposition 2
so it chooses not to carry any of the old units into the second period. The second condition
covers the case where the quality is above the threshold level but the firm is constrained in
the number of old units to sell in the second period by the number of units leftover from
period one. Under the third and fifth conditions, the firm is no longer constrained in the
number of old units it can sell so its decision is based on whether or not the quality level falls
above the upper threshold level described in Proposition 3. These five conditions correspond
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to regions on a two-axis plot of the quality level and the old product selling quantity. The
regions (abbreviated as C1 for Condition 1, C2 for Condition 2, etc.) are shown in Figure 1.
*** Insert Figure 1 Here ***
Checking the first order conditions of (9) subject to the conditions described in Table 1
gives the optimal prices of the old product (P o∗2 ) and the optimal purchase quantities of the
old (x∗2) and new product (y
∗) under conditions 1-5. Substituting these values back into
(9) gives the optimal expected second period profit under each condition. These values are
summarized in Table 2 below.
Condition x∗2 y







































As expected, the optimal purchase quantity of old(new) units increases(decreases) with
the quality of the old units. Conditions 1-5 correspond to increasing levels of quality for
the old units. Observing the expressions for y∗ in Table 2 we see that the firm never carries
old inventory when the quality level is below the lower threshold (Condition 1) but sells
the monopoly quantity of old units when the quality level is above the upper threshold
(Condition 5). As the old units become closer substitutes for the new units (q increases),
they provide a higher level of competition for the new units and the firm prepares more of
them to sell. Condition 4 gives the optimal values when the quality level is above the upper
threshold but the firm has less than the monopoly quantity of old units to sell. For quality
levels between the upper and lower thresholds, Conditions 2 and 3 give the optimal values
depending on whether or not the firm holds more (Condition 3) or less (Condition 2) old
units than the optimal selling quantity, y∗ = cq−h
2q(1−q) . Knowing the optimal responses for the
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firm in the second period, we now move back in time to the first period where the firm must
make decisions without knowing the exact market potential for its product.
3.2.2 First Period: With Uncertainty
In the first period the firm only makes price and quantity decisions for its new units. The
firm faces a market potential with a stochastic component and has to take into account the
effect of its decisions on its future performance. The total market potential for the product
is A + u, where A is deterministic and known by the firm while u is stochastic and the
firm only knows its distribution. We divide the firm’s first period quantity decision into
a deterministic and a stochastic component where the optimal deterministic component of
the quantity decision is xd1 =
A−c
2
and z represents the firm’s safety stock. Let Y be the
positive difference between the actual demand and the safety stock, Y = (z−u)+. Since the
firm knows the quality level of its leftover product before making its first period decisions,
we study the firm’s decisions under the three ranges for q discussed in Propositions 2 and 3






In this case, corresponding to Condition 1 from Table 1, the quality level of the leftover
product is below the lower threshold so the firm never carries over unsold inventory. The
expected second period profits are given in Table 2. Because no inventory is carried over
to the second period, the problem reduces to the first period problem solved for policy NC.
The firm’s optimal price and safety stock are z∗ = z̃∗ and P ∗1 = P̃
∗
1 , where z̃
∗ and P̃ ∗1 are
given in (6) and (7) respectively. Next we consider the case where the quality level is high










In this case, corresponding to Condition 2 from Table 1, the quality level of the leftover
product is sufficient for the firm to carry over some of the unsold inventory. For quality levels
in this range, we see from Table 2 that the firm never carries more than cq−h
2q(1−q) units, which
is the maximum amount it will sell in the second period and that this maximum amount it
less than the upper limit for u. For ease of notation, let Ψ = cq−h
2q(1−q) represent this upper
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bound of the amount of unsold product the firm carries over to the second period. The
profit for the first period after the total market potential is realized (u = U) is the difference
between the firm’s sales revenue and cost plus its discounted future profits:
























+ ρΠ2(0), if z ≤ U
.
where Table 2 gives the expressions for Π2 (Ψ) , Π2 (z − u) , and Π2 (0) under Conditions 3,
2, and 1 respectively. Before the uncertainty of the market potential is resolved, the firm’s
expected two-period profit is
Π12 (z, P1) =
z−ΨZ
0








[P1 (A− P1 + z) + ρΠ2(0)]f (u) du− c(A− P1 + z).
The first integral in (10) covers the probability that the market potential is low and the firm
carries only a fraction of the leftover inventory to the second period, Y = Ψ. The second
integral covers the probability of a medium level market potential and the firm carries all
of its leftover product to the second period, Y = Eu(z − u). The third integral covers the
probability that the market potential is high and the firm stocks out in the first period, thus
it has no units to carry over to the second period, Y = 0. The last component of (10) is
the cost to purchase the new units.
The firm’s objective is to maximize its expected profit which is jointly concave in z and
P1. Solving the first order conditions with respect to z yields;
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∂E [Π12 (z, P1)]
∂z
= P1[1− F (z)]− c+
zZ
z−Ψ
[2ρq (1− q) (u− z) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du . (11)
It is not possible to obtain a closed form solution for optimal safety stock in the general
distribution case. We can, however, rearrange terms so that a comparison to the results in
the NC policy is possible. Solving (11) for z gives the iterative solution
z∗ = F−1u

P ∗1 − c+
z∗Z
z∗−Ψ
[2ρq (1− q) (u− z∗) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du
P ∗1
 . (12)
The following lemma compares this optimal quantity with the optimal quantity from the






Lemma 1 The optimal safety stock under the C policy and Condition 2 is higher than
the optimal safety stock for the NC policy.
Lemma 1 states that a firm should purchase more product in the first period when it has
the possibility of selling unsold product in the second period. This result is not as obvious as
it may appear at first glance. There are two counter-acting effects taking place in the firm’s
first period quantity decision. On one hand, the availability of a second selling opportunity
lowers the firm’s overage cost and induces it to produce more. On the other hand, the
cannibalization of its new product sales in the second period by its old product drives its
overage cost up, inducing it to produce less in the first period. Our proposition shows that
under Condition 2, the “purchase more” effect dominates the “purchase less” effect resulting
in a larger quantity than when the firm does not carry over its unsold inventory. We now
continue the analysis by solving for the optimal price.









which has the same relationship to z∗ as in policy NC (7). We can now state the second
lemma that compares the firm’s first period price under the C and NC policies.
Lemma 2 The optimal first period price under the C policy and Condition 2 is higher
than the optimal price for the NC policy.
We are now ready to prove our main result comparing the optimal decisions under the
Carry versus No Carry policies.
Proposition 4 The expected leftover inventory under the C policy and Condition 2 is
higher than the expected leftover inventory under the NC policy.
A simple way to interpret Proposition 4 is that a firm should carry more safety stock
in the first period when there exist an option to sell unsold product in the second period.
Safety stock under price-dependent demand increases with the quantity and price of the
product. Lemmas 1 and 2 show that both quantity and price increase under the C policy,
implying that the benefit from the second selling opportunity in the second period is greater
than the detrimental cannibalization effects. While we prove our results only for Case B,
















In Case C, corresponding to Condition 3 from Table 1, the quality level of the leftover
product is sufficient for the firm to carry over some of the unsold inventory but the maximum
limit to the amount it will carry is larger than the maximum limit of the market potential
uncertainty. Case D corresponding to Conditions 4 and 5 from Table 1, the quality level
of the leftover product is above the upper threshold level and the firm prefers to sell all
of its leftover product in the second period, up to the monopoly quantity qA+qu−h
2q
, before
producing any new product. The results for these two cases are given in the appendix. The
analysis for the optimal quantity and price decisions is similar to Case B and is not repeated
here.
3.2.3 Numerical Example
We illustrate our model through a numeric example. First assume that the market poten-
tial uncertainty variable is uniformly distributed along the range [0, 100]. Now assume the
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following parameter values: A = 50, ρ = .9, c = 10, h = 5, and q = .8. Since (q > h
c
) then
the quality of the leftover product is above the lower threshold value and it is optimal for the
firm to follow policy C, i.e.,. to carry some of its unsold inventory into the second period.
Next, check to see if the quality level is below the upper threshold value (q < A+µ−c+h
A+µ
= .95).
It is, so either Case B or C applies. To determine which one, check to see if the maximum
amount to carry, Ψ = cq−h
2q(1−q) = 9.4 is larger than the upper limit for the market potential
uncertainty, B = 100. It is not, so Case B applies for these parameter values. Plugging the
values into (12), (13), and (10) gives z∗ = 81.77, P ∗1 = 54.17, and Π
∗
12 = 3627. Comparing
this to z̃∗ = 81.53, P ∗1 = 54.15, and Π̃
∗
12 = 3439 obtained from using policy NC and shows
that by choosing to carry unsold product to the second period, the firm produces more in the
first period and charges higher prices, increasing its total expected profits over both periods
by 5.5%.
3.2.4 Policy Comparisons
This section reports on a numerical study to further explore the properties of the carry policy
and compare the expected profits obtained from using the carry policy to those obtained
from the no-carry policy. In particular, we are interested in the percentage improvement of
policy C over policy NC. Note that the improvements will always be positive as policy C
represents a relaxation of policy NC.
We begin by constructing base scenarios from the following parameter values:
u˜U [0, B], f(u) = 1
B
, F (u) = u
B
ρ = .9
A+ µ = 100 c = 10
(A,B) = [(90, 20), (75, 50), (50, 100)] q = {h
c
, ..., .9, .95, .99}
h
c
= 0, .25, .5, .75
The cost of purchasing new product is normalized to c = 10, the discount rate is held
constant at ρ = .9 and the expected market potential is normalized to A + µ = 100. For
our example case where uncertainty over the market potential is uniformly distributed, any
choice for the deterministic portion of the market potential A implies a one-to-one mapping
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to the upper bound of the distribution for the uncertain portion of the market potential,
B. We study three possible combinations of (A,B) pertaining to low, medium, and high
degrees of uncertainty over the original market potential for the product. The cost ratio,
h
c
, captures varying degrees of the cost to carry over the unsold product. A low ratio of
h
c
= .025 represents the case where the only costs involved in carrying the unsold product
are just the additional handling and storage of the product while a high ratio of h
c
= .75
represents the case where the unsold product may need to be significantly updated to bring
it up to the current technology level of the new product. Note that it is never beneficial for








Table 3 presents summary data on the increase in expected profits potential from using
the carry policy (C) versus the no carry policy (NC). The C −NC column represents the
difference in profits between the two policies. These results illustrate why a firm should
consider a carry policy as increases in expected profit of over 10% are obtainable for firms
choosing to carry over the optimal quantity of unsold product to the second period. They
also provide some insight as to what conditions the carry policy is most beneficial. In
particular, firms should strongly consider the carry policy when: 1) Uncertainty over the
market potential is high (µ is significant compared to A), 2) The quality degradation of the
unsold product is low (q is close to 1), and 3) The cost to prepare the carried over unit for
the market is low compared to the cost to purchase new units (h << c).
*** Insert Table 3 Here ***
4 Extensions and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine extensions of the basic problem. We first test the sensitivity of
our results for the cases when the price of the new product is held constant between periods
1 and 2. Then we relax the assumption of the deterministic demand in the second period and
assume that there is uncertainty over the second period market potential. In the appendix,
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we analyze the case where the quality of the new product is perceived as an improvement
over the old product.
4.1 New Product Price is Held Constant (P1 = P n2 )
There are many reasons why a firm will resist changing the price for its new product from one
period to the next. Price changes sometimes confuse and frustrate customers resulting in a
loss of goodwill for the firm. If customers are strategic, they may postpone their purchase
knowing that the future holds a lower price for an item. Finally, price changes are costly
for most retailers requiring significant effort. In this section, we test the sensitivity of our
model to the case where the retailer only uses the deterministic price, Pn2 , for both periods.
The use of the deterministic price in the first period makes the problem much easier to
solve as (12) and (16) can now be solved directly by replacing P1 with Pn2 . The deterministic
price is always larger than the optimal first period price under uncertainty, i.e. P n2 > P
∗
1 .
This can be seen by observing from (13) that P ∗1 = P
n
2 − Θ (z∗) /2 and the fact that Θ (z)
is positive for any value of z. From (12) and (16) we can see that since P n2 > P
∗
1 , then the
quantity of safety stock, z, produced with the deterministic price is always larger than the
amount produced with the optimal price. Thus, the firm prices higher and produces more
when using the deterministic price heuristic.
To test how much of a penalty the firm incurs for using this constant price heuristic,
we reran our numerical example described in the previous section with the firm using the
heuristic and compared the expected two-period profits with the original expected two-
period profits obtained using the optimal policy. As expected, the penalty increases with
the amount of uncertainty and is always higher under the carry policy than the no carry
policy. Surprisingly, the penalty is small: The maximum profit penalty was 0.02 percent,
occurring in the high uncertainty case (A = 50, B = 100 corresponding to a coefficient of
variation = 0.29). While gross generalizations from such a small sample should not be
made, the study does indicate that the deterministic price heuristic may be quite good and
the need for stochastic optimization of both price and quantity may have been overstated in
the previous literature.
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4.2 Uncertainty in the Second Period Market Potential
Up to this point we have assumed that the firm learns the market potential before making its
second period decisions. This was done to isolate the effect of the inter-firm competition in
the second period and for analytical tractability. This assumption is reasonable for products
such as fashion goods where the demand in latter periods is highly correlated to demand in
the current period. It is not as good for products such as grocery items where the market
potential may vary considerably from one period to the next. In this section we check the
sensitivity of our results to this important assumption.
Because analytical solutions involving uncertainty in both periods becomes untractable,
we use a simulation study to determine the firm’s optimal second period decisions when
facing uncertainty in the market potential. For each set of discrete parameter values (q, h/c,
and the distribution and magnitude of the uncertainty)6, separate simulations are run over
the entire range of discrete decision variable values (x, y, Pn2 , and P
o
2 ). Optimal policies are
found through searching over the full state space and choosing the set of decision variable
values that result in the maximum expected profit for the particular parameter value set.
Since we only model the firm’s second period decisions, we assume an unlimited supply of
old products is available for the firm to sell, i.e. y is unconstrained. After determining the
firm’s optimal second period behavior, we can then infer the firm’s first period responses.
We choose the following distributions and parameter values for our test:
Distribution Normal, Uniform
Coefficients of Variation 0, .0058, .0173, .0289, .0404
Quality Level q = {.5, .6, .7, .8, .9}
Other Values h
c
= 0.4, A+ µ = 100
In all, 50 different scenarios were run (5 levels of variability times 5 levels of quality times
two different distributions). Each simulation captured the mean profit for a particular
scenario from 50 independent selling opportunities, replicated 1000 times. The standard
6The cost ratio h/c was not varied because the most significant effect occurs due to the ralative difference
between the cost ratio and the quality level (which was varied).
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error between replications was less than 0.001% and each parameter set was tested against
the same sample path (i.e., the simulations were coupled). The optimal policy was found
by searching over the integer decision variable set for each scenario. The results of the
simulation are given in Table 4. Each cell includes the optimal price and quantity of both
the old and new product along with the mean profit. Values of zero are used when it was
not optimal to carry any of the old product.
*** Insert Table 4 Here ***
The results of the simulation are surprising. The firm’s optimal quantity of old product
to sell decreases rapidly in the amount of uncertainty in the market potential. Before
viewing the simulation results, our intuition was that the firm would protect itself from the
uncertainty by carrying safety stock of both the old and the new product. The results,
however, show that the firm prefers to carry safety stock made up predominantly of its new
product and the quantity of old product made available to sell decreases in the amount of
uncertainty from the quantity chosen if the market potential was deterministic.
An explanation of this result can be obtained through marginal analysis. Faced with
uncertainty in the market potential, the firm carries more units than the deterministic results
from Table 2. If the realization of market potential is higher than expected, the firm’s
safety stock provides a cushion so that demand can be met and prices are maintained. If
the realization is lower than expected, the extra inventory pushes prices down. On the
margin, the benefit from having extra old product when the market potential turns out to
be high is less than the penalty when the market potential is low. This is due to the fact
that having too much old product affects both the price of the old and the new product on
the low market potential side but only adds its smaller margin on the high market potential
side. Thus, the cannibalization effect dominates the additional sale effect, causing the firm
to carry safety stock consisting primarily of its new product.
At first glance, it may appear like this result contradicts our finding from the numerical
study of the previous section where we found that the firm is more likely to carry over
old product when market uncertainty is high. The difference stems from the fact that the
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numerical study only considered uncertainty in the first period while our simulation considers
uncertainty in both periods. For the case of deterministic second period market potential,
the firm knows the exact cannibalization effect and takes it into account when deciding how
many units to produce in the first period and how to price these units. Thus, increasing
levels of uncertainty lead the firm to carry more safety stock, making it more attractive to
carry over the unsold inventory.
5 Conclusions
Wemodel the pricing and quantity decisions of a monopoly firm offering a perishable product
over two periods. In the first period the firm makes pricing and quantity decisions under
uncertainty over the market potential of the product. Once demand is realized, the firm
may have product that did not sell and must decide how many of these unsold units to carry
over to the second period. We assume that the unsold units suffer from a quality reduction,
such that the old units are not a perfect substitute for any new unit purchased in the second
period. Thus, the firm offers two product types in the second period where the carried
over product cannibalizes sales of the new product and the firm must trade-off between the
number of carried over units to offer to the market versus the number of new units. The
trade-off comes because it cost the firm less to carry over an unsold unit from the first period
than it does to purchase a new unit, but it must charge a lower price for the carried over
units to compensate for their lower quality.
We characterize the leftover product’s quality as a percentage of the new product’s quality
level. We then give the firm’s optimal pricing and quantity decisions for any given quality
level. There are two quality thresholds that determine a firm’s optimal course of action in
the first period. The lower threshold determines if a firm should carry any unsold product
into the second period. A carry policy is optimal only when the cost ratio between carrying
an old unit and producing a new unit exceeds this lower threshold value. Thus, as the
difference in quality decreases or the difference in cost increases, a firm is more likely to
carry over old units. The higher quality threshold determines how much of the leftover
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product should be carried over. For quality values between the lower and upper thresholds,
the firm should, on the average, carry a fraction of its unsold product to the second period.
For quality values above the upper threshold (a critical ratio involving the expected market
potential of the product and the costs for purchasing new and carrying unsold product),
the firm should carry all of its unsold product, up to the second period monopoly quantity
solution. In general, we show that a firm that allows for carrying unsold inventory produces
more and prices higher in the first period than a firm that does not allow the possibility of
carrying the unsold inventory into the next period.
By including price as a decision variable, we gain valuable insights into how a firm should
price its product when facing internal competition from its own carried-over units. First,
the price of the new product in the second period is not affected by the competition of the
old product. Thus, the firm charges the same price for its new units regardless of whether or
not it also sells its carried over units. Second, the relationship between the price of the new
product and the amount of safety stock produced in the first period is not affected by the
firm’s decision of how many unsold units to carry over to the second period. The first period
price does change with the quality level but only because the optimal amount of safety stock
changes.
Through a numerical study, we show that increases in expected profit of over 10% are
obtainable for firms choosing to carry over the optimal quantity of unsold product to the
second period. We perform a sensitivity analysis to gain insight into when the improvement
is the greatest. Our proposed policy provides the most benefits when: 1) Uncertainty over
the market potential is high, 2) The quality degradation of the unsold product is low, and
3) The cost to prepare the carried over unit for the market is low compared to the cost to
purchase new units.
In a sensitivity analysis, we explore the implications when a firm chooses to use a de-
terministic price heuristic in the first period. Based on our numerical study, we find that
the penalty for doing so is small with a maximum profit penalty of 0.02%. We also study,
through simulation, the case of uncertainty in the market potential for the second period.
Adding uncertainty to the second period dramatically changes our results as the firm’s op-
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timal decisions shift quickly to the no carry policy with even small amounts of uncertainty.
Thus, firms facing significant amounts of market uncertainty should dispose of their old
product rather than carry it to future periods where it will cannibalize sales of their new
product. Another possibility is to carry the old product but not make it available to sell
until it is clear that the market potential is high and there is insufficient stock of the new
product to meet demand. The details and impact of this option are left for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of Inverse Demand Functions
We follow the lead of Desai and Purohit (1998) and derive the demand functions from the consumer
utility functions. Note that the net utility, NU, from using a unit in the second period is
NU = qmφ− Pm2 , (14)
where m is an indicator variable such that m = 0 if the unit is new, m = 1 if the unit is old, and
Pm2 is the second period price of new (m = 0) or old (m = 1) units.
Consider the problem facing consumers in period 2. Each consumer has to choose from one of
the three following strategies: (i) buy a new unit (N); (ii) buy an old unit (O); (iii) be inactive
(X). In consumer utility, if all three strategies are observed in equilibrium, then consumers who
follow a N strategy value the product more (i.e., have a higher φ) than consumers who follow an
O strategy, who value it more than consumers who follow an X strategy.
Now consider the lowest valuation consumer who adopts an O strategy. This consumer is
located at a point φ0 = α− x2− y on the [0,α] line and is indifferent between following an O and
an X strategy. From (14), this consumer’s net utility from an O strategy is q(α− x2 − y)− P o2 ,
and the utility from following an X strategy is zero. Equating these two gives a price for the old
product of
P o2 = q(α− x2 − y).
Finally, consider the lowest valuation of the consumer who adopts an N strategy. This consumer
is located at a point φ00 = α− x2 and has to be indifferent between the N and O strategies. The
net utility from a N strategy is α− x2 − P n2 . Similarly, the net utility from buying an old unit is
q(α− x2)− P o2 . Equating these two utilities gives a price of the new product of
P n2 = α− x2 − qy.
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In the first period, there are only new units so their price is given by
P1 = α− x1.
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The optimal price for the new product, P n∗2 =
R+c
2
, is independent of
the quality level of the old product.
Solving the inverse demand function for old product, P o2 = q(R− x2 − y), for the quantity of




. Plugging this value into the inverse demand function




and solving for the
quantity of new product to sell gives x∗2 =
R−qR−Pn2 +P o2
1−q . Substituting the two quantity equations
into the firm’s second period profit gives Π2 = (P n2 − c)x2 + (P o2 − h)y
=
−Pn2 qR+ Pn2 q2R+ q(P n2 )2 − 2qP n2 P o2 + cqR− cq2R− qcPn2 + qcP o2 + (P o2 )2 − hP o2 + hP n2 P o2
q (−1 + q) .
Now we check to see if Π2 is jointly concave in P n2 and P
o
2 . For this to be true, the Hessian
of Π2(P n2 , P
o

















q(1−q) − 2qq(1−q) 2qq(1−q) = 4q(1−q) . Since the determinant is positive then the
Hessian is negative definite and the firm’s second period profit is jointly concave. Thus, we can use





















gives P n∗2 =
R+c
2
which is independent of q.
Proof of Proposition 2 There exists a threshold level for the quality of the old product,
h
c
, below which the firm only sells the new product.









. Substituting in P n∗2 and P
o∗





























2(1−q) ≥ 0 for q
we get q ≥ R−c+h
R
. For a quality level above this threshold, the firm only wants to sell old units so
its objective becomes MaxP o2 Π2 = (P
o
2 − h)y, where P o2 = q(R − y). The objective is clearly
concave and results in the monopoly quantity yM = qR−h
2q
. This quantity represents the maximum
that the firm will ever sell of the old product but it is constrained by the number of old product
that is left over from the first period, Y .
Proof of Lemma 1 The optimal safety stock under the C policy and Condition 2 is higher
than the safety stock for the NC policy (z∗ ≥ z̃∗).




[2ρq (1− q) (u− z∗) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du
P1
.
For a given value of z, P ∗1 (z) = P̃
∗
1 (z). Since the NC policy is optimal for lower levels of q than
the C policy, we thus need only to show that this term increases with q for a given price P1. We









[2ρ (1− 2q) (u− z∗) + ρc]f (u) du+
[2ρq (1− q) (z∗ −Ψ− z∗) + ρ(cq − h)]f (z∗ −Ψ) d (z∗ −Ψ) cq
2 + h (1− 2q)







[2ρ (1− 2q) (u− z∗) + ρc]f (u) du+
2ρq (1− q) cq − h
2q (1− q) + ρ(cq − h)]f (z
∗ −Ψ) d (z∗ −Ψ) cq
2 + h (1− 2q)







[2ρ (1− 2q) (u− z∗) + ρc]f (u) du].
For the upper limit of the integration, u = z∗, the derivative reduces to 1
P1
ρcf (z∗) dz∗ > 0. For








is monotonically increasing in u then ∂v
∂q
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 The optimal price under the C policy and Condition 2 is higher than
the optimal price for the NC policy (P ∗1≥ P̃
∗
1).
















. Since Θ (z) is decreasing in z and z∗≥ z̃∗ by Lemma 1 then P ∗1≥ P̃
∗
1.
Proof of Proposition 4 The expected leftover inventory under the C policy and Condition
2 is higher than the expected leftover inventory under the NC policy.
Follows from the fact that the safety stock is larger (Lemma 1) and the price is larger (Lemma
2) for the C policy compared to the NC policy. The larger price ensures that expected demand
is smaller (demand is inversely proportional to price by definition) and the larger safety stocks
ensures that more units will be left over for a given price Thus, a smaller demand combined with
a larger safety stock results in more expected leftover inventory.
6.3 First Period Results of Cases C and D
Case C: h
c




Case C, corresponding to Condition 3 from Table 1, the quality level of the leftover product
is sufficient for the firm to carry over some of the unsold inventory but the maximum limit to the
amount it will carry is larger than the maximum limit of the market potential uncertainty. Case
D corresponding to Conditions 4 and 5 from Table 1, the quality level of the leftover product is
above the upper threshold level and the firm prefers to sell all of its leftover product in the second
period, up to the monopoly quantity qA+qu−h
2q
, before producing any new product. The solution
for these two cases is very close to the solution for Case B and is given in the appendix. It is easy
to see that the solution for these two cases Thus, the firm carries all of its unsold units regardless
of the realization of u. The profit for the first period after the total market potential is realized is














+ ρΠ2(0), if z ≤ U
.
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Before the uncertainty of the market potential is resolved, the firm’s expected two-period profit is

















+ρΠ2(0)]f (u) du−c(xd1+z) .
(15)






[2ρq (1− q) (u− z∗) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du
P1
 . (16)




In this case, corresponding to Conditions 4 and 5 from Table 1, the quality level of the leftover
product is above the upper threshold level and the firm prefers to sell all of its leftover product in
the second period, up to the monopoly quantity Γ = qA+qu−h
2q
, before producing any new product.
The profit for the first period after the total market potential is realized is
























+ ρΠ2(0), if z ≤ U
.
The only differences between the firm’s profit in Case D from its profit in Case B are the threshold
levels and the quantity of unsold product carried over when the market potential is very low
(captured under the first condition above). Under Case D, the firm desires to sell all of its unsold
product in the second period up to the monopoly quantity Y = Γ. Before the uncertainty of the
market potential is resolved, the firm’s expected two-period profit takes the same form as (10) but
with Ψ replaced by Γ. The analysis for the optimal quantity and price decisions is similar to Case
B and is not repeated here.
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6.4 Extension to Increasing Quality: New Product Has Level 1+q
In our basic model, we assumed that the consumers’ valuation of a new product remained constant
from one period to the next and that their valuation of a left-over product degrades in relation to
the new product. While this assumption is true for most grocery perishables (where, for example,
most consumers value a fresh bagel the same from one day to the next), it is not always the case
for markets where new models are introduced. If the new models contain advanced functionality
over the older models they are replacing then it is reasonable to assume that consumers will place a
higher valuation on the new model and thus, the product will have a higher reservation price than
the new product in the previous period (a notable exception is the personal computer industry
where prices for state of the art computers have remained constant from year to year despite the
dramatic advances in their capabilities). In this section we assume that the consumers’ valuation
for the old model remains the same but they perceive the new model as providing higher quality.
Assume that the consumers’ perceived value for each new unit is (1+ q) times the valuation of
the old model. The inverse demand functions for this model are
P n2 = R− x2 − y + q(R− x2) and P o2 = R− x2 − y.
The firm’s second period objective is given by (9), the same as the decreasing quality case. The
firm’s optimal purchasing and pricing decisions under the most common condition are
x∗2 y















The optimal decisions under the other four conditions, as well as the new quality thresholds that
define the conditions can be easily derived in a manner similar to the basic model. Just as in the
basic model, the price of the product that maintains its same valuation of quality is independent
of the quality level of the competing product. Under the increasing quality assumption however,
the price of the new product changes from its deterministic equivalent in the first period. The
quality level of the new product does affect the quantity of the old product that the firm puts in
the market. In our basic model, the quality of the old product only affected the quantity, not the
38
price, of the new product.
6.5 Additional Derivations for the Reviewers’ Benefit
Derivation of second period results
Condition 2: h
c







x2= R− P n2−qY
P o2= q(R− (R− P n2−qY )− Y ) = q (P n2 + qY − Y )
Π2= (P
n
2−c)(R− P n2−qY ) + (q (Pn2 + qY − Y )−h)Y
= P n2R− P n2−cR+ cP n2+cqY + q2Y 2−qY 2−Y h
∂Π2
∂Pn2
= R− 2P n2 + c gives P n∗2 = R+c2








x∗2= R−R+c2 −qY =R−2qY−c2
Condition 3: h
c






































≤ q & qR−h
2q
> Y
Same as Condition 2.
Condition 5: R−c+h
R















































Derivation of first period results
Policy C, Case B: Derivation of z∗and P ∗1
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We begin with the firm’s two period expected profit:





























+ρΠ2(0)]f (u) du− c(xd1+z) .
We assume that the firm determines the production quantity and price simultaneously and that




is always above xd1, the deterministic quantity, where x
d
1 = A− P1. Thus, the expression for the
profit function is obtain by substituting xd1 = A− P1 and by incorporating Π2 (Ψ) , Π2 (z − u) ,
and Π2 (0) from Conditions 3, 2, and 1 respectively:
Π12 (z, P1) =
z−ΨZ
0
[ P1 (A− P1 + u)+
ρ
q(A− u)2 − q2(A− u)2 − 2cq(A− u) + 2cq2(A− u) + qc2 − 2qch+ h2


















f (u) du− c(A− P 1+z).
To find the optimal safety stock, we check the first order condition of Π12 (z, P1) with respect to
















+ q (z − u) (q (z − u)− (z − u) + c)− (z − u)h]]
∂z
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[ρ[−h+ q [c+ 2 (1− q) (u− z)]]] f (u) du
+
"






P1 (A− P1 + z −Ψ) + ρ[(A− z +Ψ− c)
2
4
+ q (Ψ) (q (Ψ)− (Ψ) + c)− (Ψ)h]
#
∗
f (z −Ψ) d (z −Ψ)+
BZ
z
P 1f (u) du−
"
P1 (A− P1 + z) + ρ
µ
A+ z − c
2
¶2#
f (z) dz − c
= 0.
It is straight forward to verify that the coefficients of f (z −Ψ) d (z −Ψ) sum to zero:
−






P1 (A− P1 + z −Ψ) + ρ[(A− z +Ψ− c)
2
4
+ q (Ψ) (q (Ψ)− (Ψ) + c)− (Ψ)h]
#
= 0,
and the same is true for the coefficients of f (z) dz;
"







P1 (A− P1 + z) + ρ
µ











[ρ[−h+ q [c+ 2 (1− q) (u− z)]]] f (u) du+
BZ
z
P1f (u) du− c
= P1[1− F (z)]− c+ 2ρq (1− q)
zZ
z−Ψ




= P1[1− F (z)]− c+
zZ
z−Ψ
[2ρq (1− q) (u− z) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du.








[2ρq (1− q) (u− z∗) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du
P1
 .
To determine the optimal first period price, we check the first order condition of Π12 (z, P1) with










(A− 2 P1 + u)f (u) du+
BZ
z
(A− 2 P1 + z)f (u) du+ c






zf (u) du+ c
= A− 2 P1 + µ+
BZ
z
(z − u)f (u) du+ c.








where z∗ is given above.
Policy C, Case C: Derivation of z∗and P ∗1
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Before the uncertainty of the market potential is resolved, the firm’s expected two-period profit
is


















+ρΠ2(0)]f (u) du− c(xd1+z) , (17)
This expands to
Π12 (z, P1) =
zZ
0
 P1 (A− P1 + u) + ρ[ (A+u−c)
2
4
+q (z − u) (q (z − u)− (z − u) + c)− (z − u)h]










f (u) du− c(A− P 1+z).







[ρ[−h+ q [c+ 2 (1− q) (u− z)]]] f (u) du
+
"








P 1f (u) du−
"
P1 (A− P1 + z) + ρ
µ
A+ z − c
2
¶2#




[ρ[−h+ q [c+ 2 (1− q) (u− z)]]] f (u) du+
BZ
z




[ρ[−h+ q [c+ 2 (1− q) (u− z)]]] f (u) du+ P 1[1− F (z) ]− c.
43






[2ρq (1− q) (u− z∗) + ρ(cq − h)]f (u) du
P1
 .
To determine the optimal first period price, we check the first order condition of Π12 (z, P1) with
respect to the first period price:





(A− 2 P1 + u)f (u) du+
BZ
z
(A− 2 P1 + z)f (u) du+ c






zf (u) du+ c
= A− 2 P1 + µ+
BZ
z
(z − u)f (u) du+ c.








where z∗ is given above.
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A=90, B=20 A=75, B=50 A=50, B=100
q C NC C-NC C NC C-NC C NC C-NC
0.1 3775 3766 9 3692 3643 49 3627 3439 188
0.2 3777 3766 11 3694 3643 51 3631 3439 192
0.3 3780 3766 14 3697 3643 54 3634 3439 195
0.4 3784 3766 18 3702 3643 59 3638 3439 199
0.5 3788 3766 22 3707 3643 64 3644 3439 205
0.6 3794 3766 28 3715 3643 72 3653 3439 214
0.7 3803 3766 37 3728 3643 85 3667 3439 228
0.8 3814 3766 48 3750 3643 107 3693 3439 254
0.9 3828 3766 62 3796 3643 153 3762 3439 323
0.95 3836 3766 70 3829 3643 186 3850 3439 411
0.99 3843 3766 77 3861 3643 218 3955 3439 516
h/c=.25 h/c=.25 h/c=.25
A=90, B=20 A=75, B=50 A=50, B=100
q C NC C-NC C NC C-NC C NC C-NC
0.3 3773 3766 7 3690 3643 47 3627 3439 188
0.4 3775 3766 9 3692 3643 49 3628 3439 189
0.5 3777 3766 11 3694 3643 51 3631 3439 192
0.6 3781 3766 15 3699 3643 56 3637 3439 198
0.7 3787 3766 21 3706 3643 63 3644 3439 205
0.8 3797 3766 31 3720 3643 77 3659 3439 220
0.9 3809 3766 43 3753 3643 110 3701 3439 262
0.95 3816 3766 50 3782 3643 139 3764 3439 325
0.99 3823 3766 57 3811 3643 168 3856 3439 417
h/c=.5 h/c=.5 h/c=.5
A=90, B=20 A=75, B=50 A=50, B=100
q C NC C-NC C NC C-NC C NC C-NC
0.6 3774 3766 8 3691 3643 48 3627 3439 188
0.7 3776 3766 10 3693 3643 50 3630 3439 191
0.8 3782 3766 16 3700 3643 57 3637 3439 198
0.9 3792 3766 26 3717 3643 74 3656 3439 217
0.95 3799 3766 33 3740 3643 97 3691 3439 252
0.99 3804 3766 38 3765 3643 122 3766 3439 327
h/c=.75 h/c=.75 h/c=.75
A=90, B=20 A=75, B=50 A=50, B=100
q C NC C-NC C NC C-NC C NC C-NC
0.8 3774 3766 8 3690 3643 47 3627 3439 188
0.9 3777 3766 11 3694 3643 51 3631 3439 192
0.95 3782 3766 16 3703 3643 60 3641 3439 202
0.99 3788 3766 22 3723 3643 80 3684 3439 245
Table 3:  Two-Period Profit: Uniform Distribution, c=10, rho = .9
Normal Distribution Uniform Distribution
Coef of Decision Quality Level, q Quality Level, q
Variation Variables 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
0 X 20 35 40 42.5 44 20 35 40 42.5 44
Px 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
y 27.78 12.5 7.14 4.17 2 27.78 12.5 7.14 4.17 2
Py 47 42 37 32 27 47 42 37 32 27
Prof 2094 2050 2036 2029 2026 2094 2050 2036 2029 2026
0.0058 X 19 38 41 46 46 20 38 44 45 46
Px 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
y 29 9 6 0 0 27 9 2 1 0
Py 47 42 37 0 0 47 42 37 32 0
Prof 2070 2030 2018 2014 2014 2059 2030 2019 2017 2015
0.0173 X 20 47 47 47 47 20 46 47 47 47
Px 54 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
y 28 0 0 0 0 27 1 0 0 0
Py 47 0 0 0 0 48 40 0 0 0
Prof 2026 1999 1999 1999 1999 2019 2000 2000 2000 2000
0.0289 X 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Px 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Py 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prof 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
0.0404 X 48 48 48 48 48 50 50 50 50 50
Px 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Py 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prof 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964
Parameters:  h = 4, c = 10, E[ A + u ] = 100
Table 4:  Simulation Results
